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Expectations of the Next (Future) war is fundamentally important in context of training of new 
generation of soldiers and planning state defense policy. Predictions on what kind of war next 
conflict is going to be directly influences armament and training of units. At the same time, type of 
the Next war, is dependent on development of military equipment and novelty in application of art 
of war as well as on resources available for warfare. Officers of Latvian army mainly were trained 
in Russian imperial military academies, what in combination with their own war experience of the 
Great War and War of Independence made common understanding of warfare and shaped common 
expectations of future war. Notwithstanding that many new and talented officers attended military 
academies of France and Czechoslovakia thus bringing new West European ideas into Latvian 
military thinking. Until Second Italo – Abyssinian war development of perception of the Next war 
was mostly theoretical, but this war same as Spanish civil war brought practical approach to 
development of military thinking.  
 
Research question of the paper is what were the expectations and perceptions of the Next war 
by officers of Latvian army. In development of armed forces it is necessary to avoid practice that 
army is trained for previous war, not the next one. As it is wrong to evaluate action of historical 
actors,  in this case – politicians and soldiers, by knowledge of later time, to give a background for 
evaluation of preparedness of armed forces for forthcoming conflict, it is necessary to understand 
what was the expected future warfare – that includes not only broadness and length of conflict, but 
also type of actions – how technical it will be and which types of forces will be dominant. Author 
draws a hypothesis that joint expectations of the Next war were based on outdated perceptions of 
warfare.  Up to now such evaluation of Latvian military thinking has not been done. 
 
Purpose of paper is to analyze background of ideas of officers about Next war, to make ground 
for understanding theoretical reasons for realized national defense policy. Full evaluation of Latvian 
defense capability in 1939 – 1940 is impossible without understanding of reasons of realized state 
defense policy. And one of these reasons was expectations of the Next war.  
To reach the aim of this research wide source base is used. Analysis of articles written by 
officers in military press, study materials in military academy and headquarter training materials as 
well as policy papers and legislative documents are used. Content analysis of each source shows 
only small part of common understanding and it is necessary to measure the impact of each source. 
Headquarter trainings are used as a case study for implementation of over-viewed expectations of 
type of forthcoming war. As far as it is possible to do that based on scientific literature and 
secondary sources, author also is comparing Latvian military thinking on the expectations of the 
Next war with Estonian and Lithuanian cases, that show joint development of Baltic military 
thinking. Chronologically of paper covers period from the end of War of Independence to beginning 
of the Second World war, which actually was that Next war in which Latvia got involved.  
 
Main finding of research shows that just after the Great War and War of Independence officers 
of Latvian army thought that the next conflict in which Latvia might got involved will be a 
combination of techniques of both previous wars – forces will be low mechanized and there will be 
masses drawn in action, but warfare itself will be mobile.  
Spanish civil war, Winter war, German – Polish and Soviet – Polish wars showed high level of 
mechanization in European warfare, that led towards changes in theoretical perceptions of officers 
of Latvian army. Latvian officers re-evaluated role of mechanization and technical units in warfare 
In whole period it was highly expected that in the Next war combat gases will play important 
role.  
It is notable that in every single type of arms was quite deep understanding of development of 
that particular type of forces. For example, aviation officers realized boosted role of aviation in 
future combat, or artillery officers evaluated changes in artillery equipment as important factor in 
changing of type of Next war, but these perceptions did not became common and had not enough 
influence on common expectations of the Next war. 
Experience gained by officers while training abroad and newest theoretical findings were not 
used effectively enough to influence common perceptions of majority of members of armed forces, 
managers of army and political decision makers. 
 
Main conclusions of paper are that mainly there were no common understanding of type of the 
Next war and though some officers showed novelty in their judgments about development of one or 
another branches of military science and armed forces, until real combat in European theater, 
expectations of the Next war are very variable and mutually incompatible. Thus it is possible to say, 
that common expectations of the Next war were not formulated clearly enough and together with 
out dated perceptions that led to misunderstandings in a field of cooperation and in making of 
political decisions. In second part of 30ies the understanding of the Next war, as highly mechanized, 
total war started to raise and led to some changes in state defense policy and defense plans. 
Nevertheless they still did not cover full spectrum of future warfare as it was understood by 
officers. Despite there was significant cooperation with military academies of France and 
Czechoslovakia, implementation of West European ideas into Latvian military thinking was slow. If 
the officers mainly understood development of their branch of service, common understanding on 
wider perspective was hardly to formulate. Change of paradigm in Latvian military thinking came 
too late and was too slow to leave a significant impact of organization of armed forces, thus it is 
possible to say that Latvian army did not follow main course of revolutionary changes in military 
thinking in 20ies and because of that same as because of lack of resources for military development, 
was not competitive with challenges of Next (Future) war, when Second World war was on the 
stage. 
